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WD_349/ 2007
(  Satoshi Kinoshita )
| Series: | Works on paper: Drawings 4 | | Medium: | oilstick on paper | | Size (inches): | 25.6 x 17.7 | | Size (mm): | 650 x 450 | | Catalog #: | WD_0349 | | Description: | Signed, date and copyright in pencil on the reverse.
The Legacies of Operationism and Positivism in Psychology
Theory & Psychology 1992 Vol. 2(3): 363-390
The Misleading Concept of Cognitive Competences
Angus Gellatly, Department of Psychology, School of Human Development, University of Keele, Staffordshire, UK.
Note: Continued from the preceding "page" as "WD_348".
Logical Necessity
Logic is frequently considered as a kind of bedrock discipline on which theories can be grounded. This faith in logic is revealed when a participant in some protracted psychological debate appeals to logic for a final ruling. Such appeals are not uncommon in the cognitive literature. As already noted, Breslow (1981) concluded that for a child to be credited with transitivity he or she must demonstrate an understanding of the necessity and reversibility that underlie the concept. Similar appeals to an understanding of logical necessity as the criterion for having such a concept had previously been made in connection with the debate over the acquisition of the conservations. Thus Hall and Kaye (1978) describe how children who conserved weight in the standard Piagetian test might be reclassified as only pseudo-conservers because they appeared to abandon conservation thinking when presented with contradictory evidence. Specifically, if an experimenter surreptitiously removed some plasticine when transforming' the shape of one of two balls whose equal weight had already been: ascertained, such children evidenced little surprise at the new inequality of weight. Nor did they attempt to account for it on a basis of assume~ conservation. It seems they were expected to demonstrate their grasp of the necessity of conservation by challenging the experimenter and accusing him of cheating.
The pitfall in trying to reduce understanding of conservation to understanding of its logical necessity is to be found in the ease with which apparent necessity can be challenged. Mangan (1978) points out that success on conservation tests reflects the extent to which a child has learn to think in terms of certain scientific paradigms. These paradigms actually pertain to idealizations of the physical world. As has often been remarked in actual conservation experiments some plasticine does stick to the experimenter's hands, or some of the liquid does remain in the original: beaker. Hall and Kaye point out that while in the conservation test the child is expected to suppress such knowledge and perceptual information in deference to the idealization: this is not the required strategy in all [p. 380] circumstances. The child must not only have some grasp of conservation but also of the circumstances in which it is to be invoked. For instance, en sometimes conserve mistakenly and at other times mistakenly fail to conserve both area and perimeter length (Flavell, 1985; Light & Gilmour, 1983). Again, the specific circumstances are as important as the principle in determining what is a 'correct' answer.
The appeal to logical necessity as a criterion for having conservation or transitivity is wholly within the Piagetian tradition (e.g. Piaget, 1971; man & Timmons, 1982; Russell, 1982). There are two points to be here, however.
First, as a structuralist and genetic epistemologist, Piaget was primarily interested in the psychogenesis of necessity as a category of experience, than in its recognition in particular cases by particular individual children (Piaget, 1986; Murray, 1990). Secondly, although one can readily stand a sense in which logical necessity inheres in the conservation one can just as readily understand an alternative sense in which, as an (1978) and others point out, the conserving response is not ed by any necessity. The same applies in the case of transitivity. One can see a sense in which the Chalmers and McGonigle (1984) task is a transitivity test that embodies a form of logical necessity; but so, too, can one readily see a sense in which it is not and does not (see above).
The more general point here is that logical necessity is always of this e (Gellatly, 1987). For the fact is that debates between professional logicians equally turn upon different senses, or interpretations. Logicians deny the intuitive necessity claimed for an adversary's inference by calling question the background assumptions and implicit interpretations against which the claim functions. They refuse to accept the inference in the sense in which it is intended because they are well aware that its apparent necessity will arise only within that particular sense. By analyzing various controversies in the history of Logic, Bloor (1983) demonstrates this to be a normal mode of procedure. He shows how different groups of practitioners seek to establish their preferred interpretations as standard. attempt to reject the syllogism concerning Aristotle's mortality is an example of this tactic at work. The point can usefully be elaborated with the of a further example.
Rips (1983) states that it would be hard to know what to say to somebody who did not accept the following
(2)
If there is an M on the blackboard, there is an R.
There is an M.
------------------
Therefore there is an R.
Rips takes (2) to be a clear example of modus ponens, which may be presented as: [p. 381]
(3)
If p, then q.
p.
------------------
Therefore q.
Though one easily sees what Rips is getting at, disagreement is far from difficult. If in (2) the statement 'There is an M on the blackboard' is equivalent to 'p', then the second premiss is not equivalent to 'p' and we do not have modus ponens. Mostly we accept (2) as an instance of modus ponens because we agree to accept the sense in which it is intended. We make the two invited inferences, that the M of the second premiss is indeed on the blackboard, and that therefore there is an R. Notice that I refer to both inferences as invited. This is in contrast to the habit of distinguishing inferences that are supposedly only invited from inferences that are supposedly necessary (Geis & Zwicky, 1971). The present argument is that all inferences may be said to be invited because we never have to accept an inference. Just as we can refuse to accept (2) until the second premiss is amended, so we could go on refusing to accept it even then. We could, for example, question whether the blackboard of premiss 2 was co-referential with the blackboard of premiss 1. Nor, by the standards of professional logicians, would there be anything especially perverse in our so doing. Bloor (1983) shows how the challenge to what another group of practitioners asserts as intuitively obvious is the stock-in-trade of the logician. In sum, what appear to be logically necessary inferences are only those against which a successful campaign has yet to be conducted. Even (3), which is sometimes pointed to as what modus ponens simply is, need not be immune. For until the pattern of symbols is interpreted in keeping with a very special tradition of high literacy it remains just that, a pattern of marks on paper. Indeed, the fragility of inferential necessity was pointed out by Carroll (1895) in his famous dialogue between Achilles and the tortoise. The tortoise shows how readily one may refuse to draw even the most seemingly obvious (to us) conclusion.
To summarize: In this section it has been argued that the necessary is no more finite and stable a category than any other. A criterion for understanding necessity can be no more readily agreed upon than one for understanding transitivity, conservation or counting principles.
Nominalism in Other Areas
Although this paper has dealt at some length with transitivity, deduction and counting skills, the same arguments can be made in respect of many other areas of cognition. For reasons of space, in this section only a few such areas and the problems they raise are identified [p. 382]
During the last 25 years a great deal of research into memory development has focused on the appearance of strategies such as rehearsal, categorization and use of retrieval cues. The problem arises in knowing how to conceptualize these strategies. The overwhelming tendency has talk about strategies as if they had the form of rules that children learn and then use to guide their behaviour (Chi, 1985; Chi & Rees, 1983; 1985; Kail, 1984). Chi and Rees (1983) specifically assimilate mnemonic strategies to the notion of rule adoption. They liken them to the entified by Klahr and Wallace (1973) on class inclusion, Young (1978) on length seriation and Siegler (1976) on balance-beam problems. Unfortunately, however, they do not follow these authors in interpreting such as descriptions of performance as seen from within an observer's framework, but interpret them as representations that children use to behaviour.
In her 1985 paper Chi persisted with this same interpretation but an ing tension is to be found in her thinking here. The main point Chi emphasizes is that whether or not a child exhibits a mnemonic strategy such as categorical organization depends on domain knowledge. Chi (1983) had described how children knowledgeable about the domain of dinosaurs were able to engage in sophisticated classificatory behaviour that was absent when they dealt with an unfamiliar domain. In Chi (1985) she hat the fact that such expert children excel in memory performance the same domain of expertise (exhibiting categorical organization -remembered material) suggests that they have acquired domain strategy rules for memorization. Yet what theoretical work is being these hypothetical strategy rules? They provide a description of . of the children's performance in remembering lists of dinosaurs heir performance with lists of less familiar items. So why locate the side the child rather than in our description of a particular performance? What we have here is an analogue of the fact that children appear to conserve or have transitivity on some tests but not others, or of the effects observed with reasoning tasks. Arguments against mentally represented rules, or competences, apply equally to the one case as to the hat is interesting here is that Chi (1983) specifically suggests that the ability to classify pictures of dinosaurs results directly from the way the expert child’s knowledge is organized and that it does not rely on following inference. Yet Chi (1985) proposes that categorization in recall must reflect the following of strategy rules rather than similarly resulting From knowledge organization.
Clearly the temptation to postulate rules and strategies is one that has to be repeatedly resisted. (The of resisting the temptation and the linguistic knots that can result from attempt resistance are only too well illustrated in Gellatly, Jones, 1988.)
Research into understanding of the physical world by infants is another [p. 383] area in which problems of nominalism are to be found. Whereas Piaget set a criterion of relatively sophisticated manual search for an attribution of object permanency, revisionists such as Baillargeon (1986), Bower (1967), Harris (1975) and Slater (1990) have adopted less stringent criteria, often based on visual search or visual attention. It is easy to see how a distinction between implicit and explicit permanency or pseudo-permanency and true permanency could be introduced into the debate. The point here is that although important discoveries about the behaviour of infants towards objects continue to be made, the notion of object permanence—or an object concept—remains with us. This notion needs to be recognized as one elaborated in discourse. To reify the notion and then seek to impute, or not, the reified entity to individuals is a mistaken undertaking. (But see Diamond, 1988, for a sophisticated Level 2 analysis of tasks of this sort.)
Yet another area of research that repays analysis is that of the infant and young child's 'theory of mind'. The tests employed in this research are thought to be diagnostic of 'powers of mind' (Leslie, 1990). However, the race is already on to find 'more sensitive' tests that can identify particular powers in ever younger children (Wellman & Bartsch, 1988). Furthermore, a distinction has been introduced (Baren-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1986) between conceptual perspective-taking, necessary to represent another person's mental states, and perceptual perspective-taking, necessary for a child to follow an adult's line of sight (Cox, 1986) or to pass such tests as the three mountains and policemen tasks (Donaldson, 1978; Flavell, 1985). Leslie (1987) argues that the former, but not the latter, involves construction of second-order representations. Yet this distinction is likely to prove as difficult to maintain as any of those proposed in relation to transitivity. After all, why should we not talk of explicit and implicit second-order representations? The difficulty of avoiding a reprise of previous debates over competences is well illustrated in a thoughtful article by Johnson (1988).
The last area of research to be mentioned in this section is that of culture and cognition. Although—as will be argued in a moment—some of the most useful contradictions of the nominalist tendencies that pervade cognitive psychology (and other disciplines) have come from cross-cultural studies of cognition, these contradictions have not always been immediately seen as such. Cross-cultural researchers can be as prone to nominalist habits as anyone else, and the importing of mainstream developmental theories into cross-cultural research has tended to foster those habits. To take just one example, Luria (1976) proposed that schooling/literacy leads to the acquisition of a new mode of abstract thought. In other words, the non-literate supposedly lacked a competence attributed to the literate Cole (1976) counter-argued that what really follows from schooling/literacy are 'changes in the application of previously available modes to the particular problems and contexts of discourse represented by the experimental [p. 384] setting' (p. xv). Yet even here one detects a tendency to reify the ion of 'a mode of thought'.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has sought to reveal the extent to which cognitive psychology is pervaded by the nominalist habits outlined in the introductory section. se habits are inextricably bound up with the individualistic bias of the discipline and of the language in which it is conducted: on the one hand, isolated individuals have been assumed to invent, or discover, concepts cognitive skills for themselves rather than in interaction with others; the other hand, reified competences, principles and rules come to be located within the individual, and to be endowed with an agency by means of which the performances of the individual are supposedly explained.
To a considerable extent the method of the paper has been to pile up examples of the kind of theorizing and language-use to which objection is le. In this way it has been possible to show the resemblances between them.
Nevertheless, it is worth concluding on a more positive note. Cognitive psychology boasts some theorizing which not only attempts to sidestep the alls of nominalism but, in doing so, points up the emptiness of nominalist 'explanations'. It has already been remarked that the data of cross-cultural researchers, the many curious and unexpected reactions of people in other cultures to problems of 'obvious' logical structure, has caused some psychologists to rethink their basic theoretical assumptions. Many of the central ideas expressed in the present paper appear, explicitly or by implication, in Cole and Bruner (1971), Cole (1975) and Luria 76), e.g. doubts about diagnosticity, the identification of inference mechanisms, and the nature of cognitive processes (a term somewhat indiscriminately employed in the present paper). Scribner's (1977) conclusion from her experiences with non-literate subjects that verbal logic problems should be thought of as a kind of language genre also presages some of the ideas presented in earlier sections. A particularly full analysis e pitfalls of cognitive theorizing, with special emphasis on comparative lies, was given by Cole and Means (1982). Their argument, that one ,t develop simultaneous theories of the task and of the subject, can be as an attempt to get away from the positing of internal competences. Instances of this sort of theorizing in mainstream cognitive psychology also been noted in the course of this paper. Prime examples are the wok of, for example, Trabasso (1975) on TI, Johnson-Laird (1982, 1983) syllogistic reasoning, Siegler (1978) on balance-beam problems or, rather differently, Diamond (1988) on retrieval tasks.
Doubtless there are many other examples that could be cited, for there is [p. 385] much that is healthy in cognitive psychology. The aim of the present paper has been to identify instances in which the theorizing of cognitive psychologists has or has not been entrammelled in nominalist habits of thought. With the contrast between these instances clearly identified, the lure of those habits may perhaps prove more readily resistible in the future.
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. A first draft of this article was begun while the author was spending a period as visiting researcher in the Department of Psychology, University of MacQuarie, Sydney. My thanks go to Professor Jacqueline Goodnow for making the visit both possible and enjoyable, and to the Economic and Social Research Council, the British Academy and the British Council for financial support.
ANGUS R. H. GELLATLY is a Lecturer in Psychology at the University of Keele, Staffordshire. His research interests are in cognition, visual perception and the sociology of knowledge. He is editor of and principal contributor to The Skilful Mind (Open University Press, 1986), and senior editor (with D. R. Rogers and J. A. Sloboda) of Cognition and Social Worlds (Oxford University Press, 1989). ADDRESS: Department of Psychology, School of Human Development, University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire ST5 SBG, UK [p. 390]
Theory & Psychology 1992 Vol. 2(3): 363-390
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